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Abstract
This paper incorporates the vertical structure of governments into a mixed oligopoly model by
taking into consideration the public firms owned by dierent levels of governments, namely, a state-
owned public firm and a local public firm. We find that only the state-owned public firm should be
privatized when the central and local governments independently consider whether to privatize their
respective public firms. Furthermore, we shed light on the roles played by the central government apart
from that entailed by the ownership and control over state-owned public firms by introducing certain
existing policies implemented by the central government into our mixed oligopoly model. In this
regard, decentralization, location choice with respect to the state-owned public firm, and subsidization
are considered in this paper.
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I Introduction
This paper presents a theoretical analysis of mixed oligopoly with a vertical structure such that a coun-
try run by the central government is divided into two local regions run by local governments. This vertical
structure creates the possibility of vertical externalities between the dierent levels of government (e.g.,
federal, state, and local). Furthermore, the representative model in which vertical externalities are best
articulated and explicitly formulated is that of tax competition. This model deals with the situation in
which dierent levels of government impose taxes on the same tax base. Accordingly, the private sector’s
response to the tax policy decisions of one level aects the tax bases of the other levels. This sort of ex-
ternality between them does not arise only due to their co-occupation of the same tax base. For example,
several state universities compete with national universities over competent students, which implies that
one level of the government can indirectly aect another as a result of the market competition between the
public firms owned by them and through the privatization of such firms. Thus, we examine the interaction
between dierent levels of government by using a mixed oligopoly model in which public firms compete
against private firms.
The modern game theoretical analysis of mixed oligopoly can be traced back to the pioneering work
of DeFraja and Delbono (1989).1 This in addition to many existing works have assumed the theoretical
model comprising one public firm and any finite number of private firms in one country or region and
have concentrated on intra regional competition. Recently, the number of papers analyzing inter regional
competition has increased, for instance, Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998) and Fjell and Heywood
(2002). These works assume that only private firms export to a country or region containing one public
firm and several private firms. However, a public firm in a particular country or region can also compete
with and supply to other countries or regions. In the context of international trade, we can cite the example
of airline industry. In this industry, national airline enterprises compete against not only the domestic and
foreign private enterprises but also the national enterprises of other countries.2 The competition among
state universities and among state hospitals might also exemplify inter regional competition. The existing
research mentioned above has failed to capture the existence of such competition between the public firms
1Research on mixed oligopoly models has become increasingly popular in recent years. See for instance, DeFraja and Delbono
(1990) and Nett (1993) for general reviews of the models. For recent literature on mixed oligopoly, see Matsumura and Kanda
(2005), Lu (2006), Lu and Poddar (2007), and Ogawa and Sanjo (2007).
2For further detail on this example, see Dadpay and Heywood (2006).
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located in dierent regions and the fact that public firms also export to other regions.
It is surprising to find that almost all of the formal literature on mixed oligopoly has neither regarded
nor analyzed the competition between public firms of dierent nationalities and the relationships that form
between governments as a result of this competition. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions. Ba´rcena-
Ruiz and Garzo´n (2005) and Dadpay and Heywood (2006) considered the strategic interaction between
public firms located in dierent countries based on an international mixed oligopoly model and examined
the eects of the privatization of these public firms on the welfare of these countries. We can reinterpret
their model in a manner that allows us to analyze the competition existing between public firms owned
by the same level of government in a particular country. Thus, the analytical focus of their models is
on the horizontal relationships and possible externalities between states that result from the competition
between the public firms owned by them, the federal or central government being notable by its absence.
In the mixed oligopoly models employed in earlier literature and the studies mentioned above, the central
government makes its appearance, if it does so at all, as an enforcement mechanism or as the enforcer of
the relevant industrial policies, such as production subsidies for firms in industries and deregulation to inter
regional and intra regional mergers among firms.
The first and most general purpose of this paper is to argue the existence of a vertical relationship
between the central and local governments in the context of mixed oligopoly. For this purpose, we explore
the mixed oligopoly model in which the central government runs a country in which consists of distinct
regions and each region is run by the local government. Specifically, we consider the situation in which
one country is divided into two regions, such that a public firm owned by the central government is located
in one region and a public firm owned by the local government is located in the other region. Similar to
most of the existing works on mixed oligopoly, a public firm owned by the central government, that is,
a state-owned public firm is assumed to maximize the total social welfare of the entire country, while a
public firm owned by the local government, that is, a local public firm, maximizes only its own region’s
social welfare.
The second and more particular purpose is to develop some implications of the privatization policies
and several policies that are employed in mixed oligopoly with a vertical relationship between dierent
levels of government. In our specific model, similar to Dadpay and Heywood (2006), the central and local
governments simultaneously and independently consider whether to privatize their own public firms. Al-
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though they revealed that both the governments never have an incentive to privatize their respective public
firms in a mixed oligopoly with a horizontal relationship between the levels of government, it is demon-
strated in our paper that when the vertical relationship is taken into consideration, one of the governments
can have an incentive to privatize its public firm. Furthermore, we argue that an alternative role can be
played by the central government apart from that of ownership of the state enterprise. In this regard, we
consider the following three policies implemented by the central government: its location choice with re-
spective to a state-owned firm, decentralization, and output subsidization. In addition, we investigate the
eects of these policies on the state-owned and local public firms’ behaviors and social welfare. With
regard to subsidization policies, we examine not only the eects of the subsidies provided by the cen-
tral government on market outcomes but also that of the devolution of sudsidization policies to the local
governments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model used through-
out this paper. Section 3 analyzes the vertical relationship between the central and local governments
through competition between public firms owned by them and derives the equilibrium in a mixed oligopoly
model. In Section 4, we examine the strategic privatization policies implemented by the governments. Sec-
tion 5 presents some extensions and Section 6 concludes the paper.
II Model
We consider a country that is composed of two regions denoted by A and B. These regions are identical
in terms of demand and contain the same number of firms. The demand in each country is given by
P = a 2Qi (i = A; B), where P is the price and Qi is the demand in region i. We assume that these markets
are integrated, which implies that the total demand is given by P = a   QT . The number of firms in each
country is n + 1, and these firms are assumed to possess identical technologies. Let the cost of a firm be
C(xi j) = f + 12 kx2i j, where f is a fixed cost, k > 0 is a constant, and xi j is the output of firm j in region
i (i = A; B; j = 0; 1;    ; n). For simplicity, we assume that f = 0, since we do not examine an entry of
firms in this paper.
Let Xi denote the total output produced in region i and XT = XA+XB denote the total output in an entire
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country. Since the market-clearing condition is QT = XT , the total inverse demand function is rewritten as
P = a   XT . Thus, the profits of firm j located in region i are represented as the function of the outputs of
all the firms as follows:
i j = (a   XA   XB) xi j   12kx
2
i j =
0BBBBBBB@a   xA0   nX
j=1
xA j   xB0  
nX
j=1
xB j
1CCCCCCCA xi j   12kx2i j: (1)
The social welfare in region i, denoted by Wi, is measured as the sum of the consumer surplus (CS i) and
producer surplus (PS i) as follows:
Wi = CS i + PS i =
1
4
X2T + i0 +
nX
j=1
i j; (2)
and the total social welfare in the country, WT , is represented as
WT = WA + WB =
1
2
X2T +
X
i=A;B
nX
j=0
i j: (3)
According to the definition of local welfare in equation (2), the state-owned public firm’s profit, if any,
is included in welfare of the region in which the firm is located. In other words, the central government
transfers the pooled profit or the governmental surplus only to the region in which the state-owned firm is
located.3
III Vertical mixed oligopoly
As stated in the Introduction, Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2005) and Dadpay and Heywood (2006) present
the mixed oligopoly model with two regions wherein one public firm owned by the local government of
one region competes with the other public firm owned by that of the other region. Thus, in their model,
the same level of government influences market outcomes by holding the right of ownership to the public
firms and by making these public firms compete with private firms and maximize the local welfare only.
Henceforth, we call this type of mixed oligopoly a horizontal mixed oligopoly.
3Readers may consider this assumption to be somewhat unnatural and that the pooled profits of the central government should
be transfered to both the regions. Even though we consider that the central government transfers a part of the profits to the other
region, the results obtained later in the paper are not influenced provided that the size of the transfer to the other region is not
large.
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Our paper develops another mixed oligopoly model incorporating the competition between public
firms. In this model, a state-owned public firm and a local public firm compete against each other. In
the tax competition theory, vertical tax competition is defined as the competition wherein the dierent
levels of government (e.g., federal, state, and local) impose their respective taxes on the same tax base.
In imitation of the tax competition theory, we term such type of a mixed oligopoly as a vertical mixed
oligopoly because the public firms owned by the dierent levels of governments compete over the demand
for the same good. As in DeFraja and Delbono (1989), we assume that the central government wants its
public firm to maximize the total welfare of the entire country. On the other hand, we also assume that
local governments do not take into account the welfare of the other region and, consequently, its public
firm maximizes only the local welfare.
Suppose that a state-owned public firm is located in region A and a local public firm is located in region
B. In other words, the public firm in region A is owned by the central government and the public firm in
region B is owned by the local government of region B.4 We assume that firm 0 in each region is the public
firm. For analysis, we first derive all the firms’ reaction functions. Private firms maximize their profits and,
thus, their first order conditions are given as
@i j
@xi j
= a   XT   xi j   kxi j = 0; i = A; B; j = 0; 1;    ; n; (4)
while that of a state-owned public firm as a total-welfare-maximizer is
@WT
@xA0
= a   XT   kxA0 = 0: (5)
As in the previous mixed oligopoly models in which a country does not consist of several regions, the
state-owned firm’s marginal cost is equalized with the price. This is because the trade between the two
regions is, in fact, an internal trade in terms of total welfare.
The local public firm in region B maximizes the welfare of the region such that
@WB
@xB0
=
1
2
XT + (a   XT )   XB   kxB0 = (a   XT ) + (QB   XB)   kxB0 = 0: (6)
4In Section 5, we also consider the case where both the public firms are located in the same region.
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The second equality follows from the symmetry of demand in the two regions. This equation states that
the local public firm selects its output such that its marginal cost becomes higher (lower) than the price if
region B is an importing (exporting) region. If the local public firm in an exporting region increases its
output, the terms of trade for this region worsens, which in turn, reduces the social welfare of the region.
Thus, it refrains from expanding its output.
It follows from equations (4), (5), and (6) that
XNNT =
2a [(n + 1)k + 1]
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 ; Q
NN
i = X
NN
i =
a [(n + 1)k + 1]
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 ; x
NN
i j =
ak
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 ;
xNNi0 =
a(k + 1)
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 ; i = A; B; j = 1; 2;    ; n;
where NN denotes that firm 0 in both regions A and B are not private but rather public firms. These results
demonstrate that the outputs of state-owned and local public firms are the same despite the fact that they
have dierent objective functions. This can be explained as follows. Since both regions contain the same
number of private firms, region A exports to (imports from) region B when the state-owned firm produces
more (less) than the local public firm. Suppose that the state-owned firm decides to produce a large amount
of output. Given this fact, based on equation (6), the local public firm also increases its output. If region
A remains as an exporting country even after this adjustment, the dierence in output between the two
public firms is maintained. This implies that the allocation of production is inecient and that reducing
this production dierential enhances total welfare. Thus the state-owned public firm has an incentive to
produce a lower amount of output than previously, which results in the equalization of the public firms’
outputs.
Using equilibrium output above, we obtain equilibrium profits and welfare.
NNi j =
a2k2(k + 2)
2
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 22 ; NNi0 = a
2k(k + 1)2
2
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 22 ;
WNNi =
a2
h
(n + 1)k3 + 2(n2 + 3n + 2)k2 + (4n + 5)k + 2
i
2
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 22 ; WNNT = 2WNNi ; i = A; B; j = 1; 2;    ; n:
Similar to the results obtained for a typical mixed oligopoly model with increasing marginal costs, the
public firms earn higher profits than do the private firms due to their excess production. Note that provided
that the local public firm is privatized, our model is the same as that in DeFraja and Delbono (1989) in
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which one public firm competes against the private firms in a particular market or region. Based on this
fact, we compare our equilibrium profits and welfare to those in DeFraja and Delbono (1989). We denote
NP as the case where only the local public firm is privatized, that is, DeFraja and Delbono’s case. All the
equilibrium outcomes for this case NP are presented in the Appendix.
NNi j   NPi j =  
a2k2(k + 2)
h
2k2 + 2(2n + 3)k + 3
i
2
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 12 k2 + (2n + 3)k + 22 < 0;
NNA0   NPA0 =  
a2k(k + 1)2
h
2k2 + 2(2n + 3)k + 3
i
2
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 12 k2 + (2n + 3)k + 22 < 0;
WNNT   WNPT =
a2k
h
k4 + 5k3   (4n2 + 2   9)k2 + 7k + 2
i
2
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 12 k2 + (2n + 3)k + 22 :
Private and state-owned firms’ profits are lower in the vertical mixed oligopoly model than in the typical
mixed oligopoly model employed in Defraja and Delbono (1989). Excess production by the two public
firms decreases the price; consequently, all the firms in the vertical oligopoly earn lower profits. Although
the above equations indicate that profits are always lower in the vertical mixed oligopoly, it is not certain
whether the equilibrium welfare is also lower than in the typical mixed oligopoly. When parameter k
is suciently low or the number of private firms n is suciently large, welfare in the vertical mixed
oligopoly model is lower than in DeFraja and Delbono (1989). A smaller k implies that all the firms
including the public firms are more ecient, and thus, public firms expand their production. This increase
the discrepancy between the outputs of the private and public firms. Furthermore, this large discrepancy
results in inecient production allocation, which in turn, results in the deterioration of welfare. Similarly,
when the number of private firms is large, the eect of inecient production allocation on welfare becomes
large.
IV Privatization of public firms
In the previous section, we analyzed the vertical mixed oligopoly model and compared it with the typical
mixed oligopoly model employed by DeFraja and Delbono (1989). We now examine the eect of the
privatization of state-owned and/or local public firms. In our model, the decision-makers in this regard
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are the central government and the local government of region B. They independently determine whether
to privatize their public firms in order to maximize their respective objectives, that is, total welfare and
the local welfare of region B. Note that one government is strategically related to the other government.
For example, suppose that the central government privatizes the state-owned public firm. The change in
the objective function of the firm aects market outcomes and, as a result, not only total welfare but also
the local welfare of region B are changed. Thus, one government’s decision to privatize its public firm
influences the payo of the other government.
To decribe this situation, we formulate the following two-stage game. In the first stage, both the
central and local governments simultaneously determine whether to privatize their public firms. We name
their actions “privatization” and “non-privatization,” denoted by P and N, respectively. We then define
the strategies of the central and local governments as sA 2 fP; Ng and sB 2 fP; Ng, respectively. In the
second stage, all the firms simultaneously select their outputs. In accordance with the choices of the two
governments, the following four subgames in the second stage can be considered: PP, in which both
the central and local governments privatize their public firms; PN, in which only the central government
privatizes its public firm; NP, in which only the local government of region B privatizes its public firm;
NN, in which neither the government privatizes its public firm. We solve for the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (SPNE) of this game by backward induction.
Let us solve the equilibrium of the second stage. Since we have already obtained the equilibrium
outcomes of the subgame NN in the previous section, we only derive the outcomes of the three remain-
ing subgames. The equilibrium outcomes of the subgames PP, PN, and NP follow from the first order
conditions (4), (4) and (6), and (4) and (5), respectively. These outcomes are presented in the Appendix.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the first stage, we compare outputs among the four subgames. The
results of this comparison are summarized in the following lemma.
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Lemma 1.
(a) XNNT > XNPT > XPNT > XPPT ;
(b) XNPA > XNNA > XPPA > XPNA ; XPNB > XNNB > XPPB > XNPB ;
(c) xNPA0 > xNNA0 > xPPA0 > xPNA0 ; min
n
xNNB0 ; x
PN
B0
o
> xPPB0 > x
NP
B0 ; x
PN
B0 T x
NN
B0 () n S
k + 1
2
;
(d) xPPi j > xPNi j > xNPi j > xNNi j ; i = A; B; j = 1; 2;    ; n:
The intuition behind this lemma is as follows. With respect tto (a), it is clear that XNPT > XPPT , XPNT >
XPPT , and X
NN
T > X
PP
T hold due to the fact that aggressive behaviors by public firms increase the total output.
Although both the public firms have an incentive to produce more than the private firms, in equilibrium,
the incentive of the local public firm is not stronger than that of the state-owned public firm. Suppose that
there is one public firm in the market. If this firm is the local public one, then region B exports to region
A and, thus, output expansion by this firm worsens the terms of trade for region B. As a consequence of
its fear that local welfare will deteriorate due to this terms of trade eect, the local public firm restrains its
output expansion, that is, XNPT > X
PN
T . Furthermore, the reverse is true with regard to the outputs of the
private firms. It follows from this fact that each private firm’s quasi reaction function is negatively related
to XT , as seen in equation (4).
Next, we proceed to the exposition of (b) and (c). We only elucidate the relationship between xNNB0 and
xPNB0 because the other relationships in (b) and (c) can be directly explained by the aggressive behaviors
of public firms and the negative slopes of the reaction functions. Suppose that n is suciently large. In
the case of NN, the state-owned firm produces less, since substituting the outputs of more ecient private
firms for its own output is likely to generate the higher total welfare in spite of a decrease in price through
excess production by the state-owned firm, as demonstrated by DeFraja and Delbono (1989). As a result,
the local public firm also decreases its output to maintain the equivalence between the outputs of the two
public firms in NN. On the other hand, in the case of PN, not only substituting the output of the local
public firm but also avoiding deterioration in the terms of trade increases the local welfare of region B.
Thus, the output of the local public firm is less in PN than in NN.
We now investigate the first stage in which both the central and local governments determine whether to
privatize their respective public firms. The local government always selects non-privatization of its public
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firm, as indicated in the following equations:
WPNB   WPPB =
a2
h
2k3 + (4n + 15)k2 + 4(3n + 8)k + 4n2 + 22n + 31
i
(k + 2n + 5)2 2k2 + (4n + 11)k + 2n + 72 > 0;
WNNB   WNPB =
a2k
h
2k4 + (4n + 15)k3 + 2(5n + 16)k2 + (8n + 27)k + 6
i
4
k2 + (2n + 5)k + 12 k2 + (2n + 5)k + 22 > 0;
which implies that non-privatization is a dominant strategy for the local government in region B. On the
other hand, depending on k and n, the strategy of the central government is determined as follows:
WPPT   WNPT =  
a2
h
k3 + 3k2   (4n2 + 6n   1)k + 1
i
2(k + 2n + 3) k2 + (2n + 3)k + 12 ;
WPNT   WNNT =
a2
h
4k(2k2 + 4k + 1)n2 + 4k(2k2 + 5k + 3)n   2k5   12k4   27k3   28k2   13k   2
i
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 22 2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 52 :
These equations demonstrate that the reaction of the central government is complicated. Nevertheless, an
examination of the sign of WPNT   WNNT is sucient for deriving the SPNE, since the local government
always selects non-privatization, that is, sB = N. In the second equation, the answer to whether the
privatization of state-owned public firm worsens the total welfare depends on the sign of the numerator
when the local public firm is not privatized. Based on this, we obtain the following:
WPNT T W
NN
T () n T n˜ :=
(k + 1)
h
 2k2   3k + p2k (k + 1)  2k4 + 10k3 + 18k2 + 12k + 1i
2k  2k2 + 4k + 1 (> 1) :
The above indicates that if the integrated market in our model is competitive and the local government of
region B decides not to privatize its public firm, the privatization of a state-owned public firm decreases
the total welfare. This can be explained as follows. DeFraja and Delbono (1989) demonstrate that when
the number of private firms is large an improvement in cost eciency resulting from an adjustment to
production allocation through privatization outweighs a decrease in price due to excess production by the
public firm when the number of private firms is large. This can even be applied to our model. According to
Lemma 1, a larger n means a smaller xPNB0 . As the number of private firms becomes larger, the total welfare
obtained in the equilibrium outcome of PN (that is, WPNT ) approaches closer to that obtained in DeFraja
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and Delbono’s model (that is, WNPT ). Thus, from the results in the previous section, we find that WPNT is
larger than WNNT if n is large.
All the results above yield the SPNE, which are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the privatization policies of both the central and local governments (sA; sB)
are given as follows: (i) (sA; sB) = (P; N) if n > n˜, (ii) (sA; sB) = (P; N), (N; N) if n = n˜, and (iii)
(sA; sB) = (N; N) if n < n˜.
Two remarks on Proposition 1 are made here. First, Dadpay and Heywood (2005) reveal that neither
of the local governments has an incentive to privatize its local public firm. However, if one of the public
firms is owned by the central government, then the state-owned public firm should be privatized. Ba´rcena-
Ruiz and Garzo´n (2005) explain the existence of an equilibrium in which one public firm is privatized by
introducing cost ineciencies of the public firms. Proposition 1 provides an explanation for this by taking
the dierent levels of governments into consideration. Second, in the real world, local governments are
likely to follow the policies set by the central government. Once this fact is taken into account, it might
be natural to develop a model where the central government is the first mover and the local government is
the second mover in the decisions regarding the privatization of public firms. Nevertheless, the equilibrium
outcomes of this new game are the same as those of Proposition 1, since a strategy of non-privatization for
the local public firm, that is, sB = N, is the dominant strategy for the local government of region B.
V Some extensions and policy issues
In this section, we present some extensions and policy issues. As stated in the Introduction, we shed light on
an alternative role that can be played by the central government apart from that entailed by the ownership
and control over state-owned public firms. The central government as the higher level of government
can influence local governments by implementing certain policies or ensuring that they comply with the
relevant laws and rules. We consider the implications of these policies in the mixed oligopoly model. For
this purpose, we consider three policies that are implemented by the central government. First, we examine
the eect of transferring the right of ownership to a state-owned firm from the central government to the
local government. Second, we consider the policy by which the central government decides which region
to locate its public firm in. Finally, we analyze the eectiveness of output subsidies in our vertical mixed
11
oligopoly model.
Decentralization
We have analyzed the privatization of public firms and investigated the eect of this privatization on wel-
fare. Privatization is a significant policy issue worldwide. However, we should not ignore another equally
important issue regarding governance and administration, namely, decentralization. Presently, decentral-
ization is highly popular all around the world, and it has been at the center stage of policy experiments for
the last two decades in a large number of developing and transition economies. Such a decentralization
policy is often suggested as a means of reducing the role of the state in general, since it dilutes central
authority and furthers intergovernmental competition. Thus, decentralization is widely believed to promise
a wide range of benefits. In this subsection, we investigate whether or not decentralization is eective, and
consequently, whether or not it improves the total welfare of the entire country.
For this purpose, we summarize the various meanings of decentralization as the transfer of the right
of ownership to a state-owned firm from the central government to the local government. We use our
mixed oligopoly model to examine whether this transfer is desirable in terms of total welfare. In order
to maximize total welfare, the central government decides whether or not it should transfer its right of
ownership to the state-owned firm to the local government of region A and then commits to its decision.
If it transfers this right, horizontal mixed oligopoly prevails, that is, two dierent local public firms and
private firms compete in our integrated market. If otherwise, the vertical mixed oligopoly of the previous
section prevails.
To conduct a comparison between vertical and horizontal mixed oligopoly, we derive the equilibrium
outcomes in the horizontal mixed oligopoly model. In this case, each local public firm selects its output xi0
to maximize the local welfare of the corresponding region according to equation (2). On the other hand,
the other private firms maximize their profits only. Thus, we obtain the following equilibrium outcomes:
XHT =
2a [(n + 1)k + 1]
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 ; Q
H
i = X
H
i =
a [(n + 1)k + 1]
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 ; x
H
i j =
ak
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 ;
xHi0 =
a(k + 1)
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 ; i = A; B; j = 1; 2;    ; n;
where H denotes horizontal mixed oligopoly. From these outcomes, we can observe that allocation in the
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horizontal mixed oligopoly is the same as that in the vertical mixed oligopoly. This implies that the central
government cannot increase total welfare by transfering the ownership of the state-owned firm to the local
government. This is summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Decentralization as the transfer of a state-owned firm to the local government does not
improve total welfare.
Proposition 2 implies that decentralization is not desirable in terms of total welfare when the decentral-
ization incurs some cost. In addition, when the central government can decide whether it should privatize
its public firm or transfer the right of ownership to the local government, privatization is the better policy
provided the market is competitive.
Location choice regarding a state-owned firm
Next, we consider the issue of location choice with regard to a state-owned public firm by the central
government. If the central government decides that its state-owned public firm should be located in region
A, the situation under the setting of NN in Section 3 occurs. Thus, the market consists of one state-owned
public firm and n private firms located in region A and one local public firm and n private firms located in
region B. The equilibrium market outcomes in this case have been already described in Section 3. On the
other hand, if the central government decides that its state-owned public firm should be located in region
B, there exist n private firms in region A, while one state-owned public firm, one local public firm and
n private firms are located in region B. Thus, the two regions are asymmetric in terms of the number of
existing firms. For tractability of the analysis, we assume the following condition.
Assumption 1. k is suciently large, that is, k > 12 .
This assumption ensures that the local public firm is active in the case where the state-owned public
firm is located in region B. Under the above assumption, we obtain the following equilibrium market
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outcomes:
xLB0 =
a

2k2 + k   1

k 2k2 + (4n + 7) k + (2n + 5) ; xLi j = a (2k + 1)2k2 + (4n + 7) k + 2n + 5 ;
xLBn+1 =
a

2k2 + 3k + 1

k 2k2 + (4n + 7) + (2n + 5) ; XLA = an (2k + 1)2k2 + (4n + 7) k + 2n + 5 ;
XLB =
a [2 (n + 2) k + n + 4]
2k2 + (4n + 7) k + 2n + 5 ; X
L
T =
2a [2 (n + 1) k + n + 2]
2k2 + (4n + 7) k + 2n + 5 ;
WLT =
a2
h
4 (n + 1) k4 + 4

2n2 + 7n + 5

k3 +

8n2 + 33n + 27

k2 + 2

n2 + 5n + 5

k   1
i
k 2k2 + (4n + 7) k + 2n + 52 ;
i = A; B; j = 1; 2;    ; n; (7)
where the superscript L denotes the equilibrium market outcomes in the case where the state-owned public
firm is located in region B, and xLBn+1 denotes the equilibrium output of the state-owned public firm located
in region B. We compare the two public firms’ outputs in the following two cases: when the state-owned
firm is located in region A and when it is located in region B. This is useful toward comparing the total
welfare in the two cases.
xNNB0   xLB0 =
2a(k + 1)
h
k2 + 2(n + 1)k + 1
i
k k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5 > 0;
xNNA0   xLBn+1 =  
2a(k + 1)2
k k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5 < 0:
When the state-owned firm is relocated from region A to B, the output of the local public firm decreases,
whereas that of the state-owned firm increases. Consequently, region B, with two public firms, becomes an
exporting region. Excess production by the state-owned firm in region B leads to deterioration in the terms
of trade of the region. Subsequently, the local public firm decreases its output to oset this negative eect
on the local welfare of region B.
Comparing the equilibrium total social welfare in the case where the state-owned public firm is located
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in region A with that in the case where it is located in region B, we obtain the following result:
WLT   WNNT =  
2a2
h
k5 + 6k4  

4n2   14

k3 + 4 (n + 4) k2 + (4n + 9) k + 2
i
k k2 + (2n + 3) k + 22 2k2 + (4n + 7) k  2n + 52 > 0;
() n > nL :=
(k + 1)
p
k4 + 4k3 + 5k2 + 2k + 1 + 1

2k2
: (8)
Note that nL > 1 when k > 0. We obtain the following proposition directly from this result.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1, with respect to the location of the state-owned public firm, the central
government strictly prefers region B if n > nL and region A, if nL > n  1. If n = nL, for the central
government, the choice between regions A and B as the preferred location for its state-owned public firm
becomes insignificant.
Proposition 3 states that the state-owned firm should compete with the local public firm in the same
region when both the regions are fairly competitive. The intuition behind this proposition is as follows.
All the relevant outputs — namely, xNNB0 , x
L
B0, x
NN
A0 and x
L
Bn+1 — of the two public firms decrease with n.
In addition, xLB0 is the smallest of them and, thus, the closest to the outputs of the private firms. Provided
that n is large, the local public firm whose is output closer to that of each private firm yields a total welfare
that is closer to the welfare obtained in the case NP. Recall that WNPT > W
NN
T when n is large. Thus,
Proposition 3 holds.
Subsidization
Several mixed oligopoly models have stressed the importance of implementing subsidization policies in
mixed markets. Using the single region model of DeFraja and Delbono (1989), White (1996) reveals that
providing uniform production subsidies to all firms can enhance the social welfare of a region or country
and that the government can achieve the first-best allocation by employing such policies. Moreover, he
demonstrates that the government can attain the first-best allocation in the case of a private oligopoly
by providing all the private firms with the same level of subsidies as that provided in the case of a mixed
oligopoly. This implies that the privatization of a public firm is fruitless in the sense that it does not improve
welfare to the same extent that the provision of optimal subsidies improves welfare. Thus, if alternative
industry policies are available, then the government should not utilize the privatization policy.
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In this subsection, we investigate whether governments should comply with this suggestion in the case
of a vertical mixed oligopoly. For this investigation, we should recall that privatization and subsidization
policies are implemented by two types of decision-makers — the central government and the local govern-
ments. Thus, we explore the following two cases: (a) only the central government provides subsidies and
(b) the governments of both regions provide subsidies. In both the cases, we analyze the incentives for the
central government and the local government of region B to privatize their own public firms.
For the subsequent analysis, we present the first-best allocation in terms of total welfare, which is given
as follows:
xi =
a
k + 2n + 2 ; X

i =
a (n + 1)
k + 2n + 2 ; 

i =
a2 (k + 2)
2 (k + 2n + 2) ; W

i =
a2 (n + 1)
2 (k + 2n + 2) ; i = A; B:
Note that based on White’s discussion, this allocation is attainable by subsidy level s = a=(k + 2n + 2) in
the cases where the local public firm is privatized, that is, NP and PP.
We now start with case (a). In this case, it is sucient to focus on PN and NN. Here, we should
note how the central government finances subsidies. For exposition, we assume that the costs required for
subisidizing the firms in one region are financed by the lump-sum taxes collected from the residents of the
region. Under this setting, firms’ profits are rewritten as
i j = P(XT )  C(xi j) + sxi j =
0BBBBBBB@a   xA0   nX
j=1
xA j   xB0  
nX
j=1
xB j
1CCCCCCCA xi j   12kx2i j + sxi j;
while the total welfare and local welfare of the two regions remain (3) and (2), respectively. Thus, we
obtain the following results.
Lemma 2. When the central government provides an output subsidy, the optimal subsidy level is identical
to s in all four cases, namely, PP, PN, NP, and NN. Furthermore, all the allocations in these cases are
identical to the first-best allocation.
This lemma demonstrates that under the optimal subsidies provided by the central government, the local
government as well as the central government should not privatize their public firms if the privatization
incurs some costs. We elucidate the results of Lemma 2 by explaining that subsidy level s yields the
first-best allocation in NN, since the other cases can be explained in the same manner. Suppose that the
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central government sets the subsidy level to s =  P0(XT )xi j (i = A; B, j = 1; 2;    ; n). Under this subsidy
level, the first order conditions of all the private firms and the state-owned public firm are given as
P(XT )  C0(xi j) = 0;
which indicates that their outputs are equivalent in equilibrium. Hence, the trade pattern relies on the
output of the local public firm. Region B is an exporting (importing) region when this output is larger
(smaller) than the output of another firm. However, the situation wherein the region is either an exporting
or importing region is not consistent with the first order condition of the local public firm given by equation
(6). Thus, the condition is satisfied when the trade does not occur, which leads to marginal cost pricing by
the local public firm.
Next, we examine case (b). In this case, the local governments in both the regions independently select
their subsidy level. It is evident that the subsidy level chosen by one government is the same as that chosen
by the other in PP and NN on the basis of the symmetry of demand and the number of private firms.
Surprisingly, we can find that the subsidies of the local governments are the same even in PN and NP.
Moreover, all the subsidy levels in all the cases are the same as s.
Lemma 3. When the local governments employ output subsidies, the optimal subsidy levels are identical
to s in all four cases, namely, PP, PN, NP, and NN. Furthermore, all the allocations in these cases are
identical to the first-best allocation.
We explain the intuition behind this lemma. Similar to the exposition of Lemma 2, we consider only the
case of NN. Let bWi(sA; sB) denote the equilibrium welfare of region i in NN. Since each local government
sets a level of subsidy such that bWi is maximized, the following equation system is derived.
@bWk
@sk
=
X
i=A;B
nX
j=0
@Wk
@xi j

@xNNi j
@sk
= 0; k = A; B:
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Using the first order conditions of all the firms, we obtain
@bWA
@sA
= P0(XT )(XA   QA) 
@XNNT
@sA
 
nX
j=1

sA + P0(XT )xA j


@xNNA j
@sA
= 0; (9)
@bWB
@sB
= P0(XT )(XB   QB) 
@XNNT
@sB
 
nX
j=1

sB + P0(XT )xB j


@xNNB j
@sB
+

P(XT )  C0(xNNB0 )

 @x
NN
B0
@sB
= 0: (10)
Suppose that the local government of region i sets si =  P0(XT )xi j, which in turn, causes all the private
firms in both the regions to equalize their marginal costs with the price. Consequently, no trade between the
two regions follows from (9), and the local public firm also uses the marginal-cost pricing in accordance
with equation (10). Thus, this equation system in (9) and (10) is consistent with the first-best allocation
(xA0;    ; xAn; xB0;    ; xB0) and sA = sB = s =  P0(XT )xi j. In sum, we can establish the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. In the first stage, regardless of whether (i) the central government sets the output subsidy
or (ii) both the local governments simultaneously set the output subsidy in each region, the equilibrium
market outcomes are identical, and the first-best allocation is achieved.
This result is an extension of White (1996) in two directions. First, we verify whether White’s results
hold when a type of a public firm that is dierent from that used in earlier mixed oligopoly models is taken
into consideration. The local public firm in our model has an objective function that is distinct from those
of the private and state-owned public firms. However, this heterogeneity of objectives does not under-
mine White’s results.5 Second, subsidization policies are available for the dierent levels of governments.
Proposition 4 implies that decentralization of subsidization by the central government does not increase
total welfare and local welfare. Although it is an important suggestion, we should not emphasize it too
much. When the governments subsidize firms, some transaction costs might be generated to some extent
and firms may make false statements on their technologies and outputs. The amount of such costs and the
accuracy of the information provided by firms might depend on the accessibility of the subsidizing govern-
ments to the firms in each region. If the lower levels of government subsidize the firms, these transaction
5There are several other works on the extensions of White (1996) with regard to objective functions of firms. For example,
Tomaru (2006) focuses on a public firm that maximizes not rather the welfare but weighted average of welfare and profits. Further,
Kato and Tomaru (2007) analyze the case where private firms have the objective functions that include other factor apart from
profits.
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costs might be relatively low and the lack of accurate information — which contributes to the failure of the
central government’s subsidization policies — might be less acute. In this sense, decentralization could be
desirable.
VI Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we model the competition that exists between public firms owned by dierent levels of
government, namely, that between a state-owned public firm and a local public firm. Dadpay and Heywood
(2007) and Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2005) have developed a model in which local public firms owned by
the respective local governments of the two regions where they are located compete against each other, and
examine the eects of the privatization of these firms on each region’s local welfare and the total welfare.
They demonstrate that both the local governments should not preferably privatize their public firms when
all the public and private firms have the same increasing marginal cost. On the other hand, this paper finds
that the decision depends on the ownership of the public firms. Provided that one of the public firms is
owned by the central government, this firm should be privatized, though the other local public firm is never
privatized.
The eects of several policies other than privatization are also examined in our paper. First, we treat
decentralization as the transfer of the right of ownership to a state-owned public firm from the central
government to the local government. Surprisingly, this transfer policy yields the same allocation as the one
that is yielded when the state-owned public firm competes against the local public firm. In this sense, the
policy is shown to be fruitless. Second, we consider the location choice with respect to the state-owned
public firm in terms of total welfare. When the market is highly competitive, the state-owned public firm
should be established in the region where the local public firm is located, since this would achieve cost
eciency due to the adjustment of an improved production allocation and increase total welfare. Third, we
investigate the eects of the subsidization policies of the central government and the local governments and
find that the first-best allocation can be attained irrespective of which government subsidizes and whether
both the state-owned and local public firm are privatized.
Finally, we should mention the limitations of our paper and its possible extensions. Our model assumes
that both the regions contain the same number of private firms. It also assumes that the profits of the state-
owned public firm are completely transfered to the region in which the firm is located. Nevertheless, we
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believe that the results obtained from our model include instructive implications in that it incorporates
elements that stem from ownership by dierent levels of government and sheds light on some issues that
cannot be handled in more conventional models. However, this paper was not addressed several important
issues. One such issue is that we should investigate some sequential move structures in output competition.
In reality, public firms tend to enjoy leadership in the markets. Thus, we might need to consider some
additional cases where, for example, (a) only the state-owned public firm leads the other firms, (b) only the
local public firm leads the other firms, and (c) both the public firms lead the private firms. Another issue
is that foreign firms should also be taken into consideration. When foreign firms enter our vertical mixed
oligopoly, the local public firm’s actions are not aected, however, the state-owned public firm’s action
might be aected to a certain extent . It might be of interest to examine how this entry by foreign firms
influences the equilibrium outcomes and implications of privatization. Thus, these remain as questions for
future research.
Appendix
The equilibrium outcomes in subgame PP
XPPT =
2a(n + 1)
k + 2n + 3 ; Q
PP
A = QPPB = XPPA = XPPB =
2a(n + 2)
k + 2n + 3 ; 
PP
i j =
a2(k + 2)
2(k + 2n + 3)2 ;
WPPA = W
PP
B =
a2(n + 1)(k + 2n + 4)
2(k + 2n + 3)2 ; W
PP
T =
a2(n + 1)(k + 2n + 4)
(k + 2n + 3)2 :
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The equilibrium outcomes in subgame PN
XPNT =
2a [2(n + 1)k + n + 3]
2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5 ; X
PN
A =
a(2k + 1)(n + 1)
2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5 ; X
PN
B =
a [2k(n + 1) + n + 3]
2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5 ;
xPNi j =
a(2k + 1)
2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5 ; x
PN
B0 =
a(2k + 3)
2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5 ; 
PN
i j =
a2(k + 2)(2k + 1)2
2[2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5]2 ;
PNB0 =
a2(4k3 + 12k2 + 13k + 6)
2[2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5]2 ;
WPNA =
a2[4(n + 1)k3 + 4(2n2 + 7n + 5)k2 + (8n2 + 33n + 25)k + 2

n2 + 5n + 5

]
2[2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5]2 ;
WPNB =
a2[4(n + 1)k3 + 4(2n2 + 7n + 5)k2 + (8n2 + 33n + 29)k + 2

n2 + 5n + 7

]
2[2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5]2 ;
WPNT =
a2[(4(n + 1)k3 + 4(2n2 + 7n + 5)k2 + (8n2 + 33n + 27)k + 2

n2 + 5n + 6

]
[2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5]2 :
The equilibrium outcomes in subgame NP
XNPT =
a [2(n + 1)k + 1]
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 1 ; X
NP
A =
a [(n + 1)k + 1]
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 1 ; X
NP
B =
ak(n + 2)
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 1 ;
xNPi j =
ak
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 1 ; x
NP
A0 =
a(k + 1)
k2 + (2n + 3)k + 1 ; 
NP
i j =
a2k2(k + 2)
2
k2 + (2n + 3) k + 12 ;
NPA0 =
a2k(k + 1)2
2
k2 + (2n + 3) k + 12 ;
WNPA =
a2[2(n + 1)k3 + 4(n2 + 3n + 2)k2 + 2 (2n + 3) k + 1]
4
k2 + (2n + 3) k + 12 ;
WNPB =
a2[2(n + 1)k3 + 4(n2 + 3n + 2)k2 + 4 (n + 1) k + 1]
4
k2 + (2n + 3) k + 12 ;
WNPT =
a2[2(n + 1)k3 + 4(n2 + 3n + 2)k2 + (4n + 5) k + 1]
2
k2 + (2n + 3) k + 12 :
Proof of Lemma 1
For the proof of (a),
XNPT   XPNT =
a(k + 1)k2 + (2n + 3)k + 1 2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5 > 0;
XNPT   XNNT =  
ak(k + 1)k2 + (2n + 3)k + 1 k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 < 0;
XPNT   XPPT =
2a(k + 1)
(k + 2n + 3) 2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5 > 0:
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Thus, (a) holds. For (b),
XPPA   XPNA =
2a(n + 1)
(k + 2n + 3) 2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5 > 0;
XNNA   XNPA =  
a [(n + 1)k + 1]k2 + (2n + 3)k + 1 k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 < 0;
XNNA   XPPA =
a(k + 1)
(k + 2n + 3) k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 > 0:
Further,
XPPB   XNPB =
a(n + 1)
(k + 2n + 3) k2 + (2n + 3)k + 1 > 0;
XNNB   XPNB =  
a [(2n + 1)k + 1]k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5 < 0;
XPPB   XNNB =  
a(k + 1)
(k + 2n + 3) k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 < 0:
These demonstrate that (b) also holds. Finally, (c) and (d) follow from
xPPA0   xPNA0 =
2a
(k + 2n + 3) 2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5 > 0;
xNPA0   xNNA0 =
a(k + 1)k2 + (2n + 3)k + 1 k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 > 0;
xNNA0   xPPA0 =
a(k + 2n + 3)
(k + 2n + 3) k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 > 0:
xNPB0   xPPB0 =  
a
(k + 2n + 3) k2 + (2n + 3)k + 1 < 0;
xPPB0   xPNB0 =  
2a [k + 2(n + 2)]
(k + 2n + 3) 2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5 < 0;
xNNB0   xPNB0 =  
a [k   2n + 1]k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 2k2 + (4n + 7)k + 2n + 5 ;
xNNB0   xPPB0 =
a(k + 2n + 1)
(k + 2n + 3) k2 + (2n + 3)k + 2 > 0:
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Lastly,
xNPi j   xPNi j =  
ak2 + (2n + 5)k + 1 2k2 + (4n + 11)k + 2n + 7 < 0;
xPPi j   xPNi j =
2a
(k + 2n + 5) 2k2 + (4n + 11)k + 2n + 7 > 0;
xNNi j   xNPi j =  
akk2 + (2n + 5)k + 1 k2 + (2n + 5)k + 2 < 0:
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